ÿWPC¶ Ñø`¾ÄÔ¿ñ˜Ü::YweÜ6ºüåÜÂÐf‡-©<}/òï"g—:G1·VÍ+4§%Cÿ Óº8Éælôä†áwÕæúYŠéºþÄ%} ìzÇ-%ÂÆ+™¹‘Þ~ á„ØÇ{¾™=zB­/#³Î'·5¾úgaLÌ;Ÿb}‹uÞÚÔzü1 YÞPġ¨(8”böL';.‚¼  æîAË'v¬CDšôOØÇ‰+²[ªŽ–qq#¥.“B›‹èô8ð5ÕȪPeª½¶žÁP_.LÇ“­¼[¸YÕz œgˆ$ú@Dú{DÉßõd‘ðHhS…„©ÜÛ`šø jJ|.óif|Ô:8-‚ (Wö况/Œ½tëoh#¼Écñv¾qИѕåY¶Ã!*Ĺ3K͸ô䬮±ß䋬Ï:V„ÓŽÐ@šøü/Ù;wÆ*ÿ­ŠûTPn POUãíQ°>¼r“:c 0±j mj2 B8aU iN ÏåëFó9 1_A   ¨ ® ´ º Ö Ü à  ö   P Ld  ° UF¼ J  L  V  `  j  v P€ PÐ  P* Pz PÊ P Pj Pº  lP€PÐP lpPÜP,P|  ÌPÖP&PvpÆd6PšPê  :lZPÆP  fnp Þzæ `Ez |hŠ ò    *¸8#!ðUN %_Ne hgxÏ D+GU>r DK° B>û B19 B-j B-— 0NÄ 1o^ w4‘¥´(‰§Í$¡¡ÓK€U(€X°KÓÔ€VXpXXXÔÔ€VXpXXXpÔÿ€€ÿÿÿÿÀ dTABLE A€çABSTRACT:http://www.fedjudge.org/pub/982001.wpd€çTABLE OFI.II.III. SOURCES FOR JURY INSTRUCTIONSIV.#‡û37;?CGKOS°°IV.B.C.1.Same DecisionD.EConclusion|@I.N_1_N_2_Http://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792htmII.=L5 Ä 9Z+‹.Courier New RegularôsIII. SOURCES FOR JURY INSTRUCTIONSN_3_N_4_N_5_ôsIV.ôsB.Http://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792.htmlN_6_Http://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/450/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/411/792.html,ÙC.Http://www.law.cornell.edu:80/uscode/42/2000e-2.shtmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://www.law.cornell.edu:80/uscode/42/2000e-5.shtmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.html|ñ1.Http://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/93-1543.ZS.htmlHttp://www.kentlaw.edu/7circuit/1993/92-1800.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlSame DecisionHttp://law.touro.edu:80/2ndCircuit/May97/96-7523.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/490/248.htmlHttp://laws.findlaw.com/US/402/313.html|ñD.Http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-602.ZS.html|ñEHttp://www.wulaw.wustl.edu/8th.cir/Opinions/960507/952531.P8(ÖConclusionÈãN_1_Http://www.law.cornell.edu:80/uscode/42/1981a.shtmlÈãN_2_ÈãN_3_ÈãN_4_ÈãN_5_ÈãN_6_98200a¢<meta<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">˜Epson Stylus COLOR (Copy 2)0(  Z‹6Times New Roman RegularPXT˜c:\COREL\SUITE8\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~2\WEB\WP8WEB.WPTc:\Corel\Suite8\Template\Custom WP Templates\Web\wp8web.wpt'ÈÈÈÈdxd(  Z‹&Times New RomanXYXY?web3dbord1_0dxd:web3dtlo1_  ÀÀÀd ÿÿÿd-web3dbro1_ €€€d)web3dtli  €€€d)web3dbri ÿÿÿd(›$——ÔÿÔòòÔÿÔóó#zµ37=CIOU[a­­1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.=%x$áO{H$˜ … ³…3|xÝ ƒ§Í!ÝÓK€U(€XKÓÔ€VX–wXXPXÔÔ€VX–wXXVX–wÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÐ ÜÜ йÔ*ƒ  dd Xdd Xdd XxxÔÔ,ML ÔÔ, 22 ÔÔ+  ÔÐ  ¶¶ „„Ðò òòòInstructing€the€Juryóóó óÐ õõ Ðò òòòin€an€Employmentóóó óÐ VV Ðò òòòDiscrimination€Caseóóó óÐ ·· Ðò òòòðð€1998€FMJAóóó óÐ  ÐÌGerrilyn€G.€BrillÐ ÐUnited€States€Magistrate€JudgeÐ ÐNorthern€District€of€GeorgiaÌÔ% ‡ ÔÔ%†ùԀРÐò òAbstractó óÐ ^^  ÐÔÌÌÌÔ[a.1]€ÔÌÌÌKÔEmployment€discrimination€cases€oftenÏpresent€federal€trial€judges€with€emotionallyÏcharged€cases€in€which€the€stakes€are€high€forÏall€parties.€These€facts,coupled€with€the€currentÏstate€of€the€law€in€this€arena€make€the€craftingÏof€jury€instructions€a€particular€challenge€forÏthe€federal€judiciary.€This€article€summarizesÏthe€general€procedures€used€by€federal€trialÏjudges€in€preparing€jury€instructions,€exploresÏsources€for€jury€instructions,€and€then€considersÏin€detail€difficult€jury€instruction€issues€thatÏoften€arise€in€employment€discrimination€trials.Ð ÐÔ4‚Ý ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔDownload€this€article€as€a€WordperfectÐ jj ÐdocumentÔ6»ÔÝ‚\›ÏƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ýÔÐ 'WW „„'ÐÔ% ‡ ÔÔ%†ÈÔò òTable€of€contentsó óÐ õõ ÐÔ4‚ Ý ÷ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô1.€IntroductionÔ6ÔÝ‚\›'ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ÐUÔÐ ÁÁ ÐÔ4‚ Ý ÷ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô2.€ProcedureÔ6ÜÔÝ‚\›ðƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ÔÐ ŠŠ ÐÔ4‚ Ý ÷ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô3.€Sources€for€Jury€InstructionsÔ6¢ÔÝ‚\›¶ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ¾äÔÐ SS ÐÔ4‚ Ý ÷ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô4.Particular€Issues€in€Title€VII€CasesÔ6{ ÔÝ‚\› ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý y½ ÔÐ    ÐÓC€ ‡û# CÓÔ4‚Ý ÷ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔNature€Of€The€ClaimÔ6 ÔÝ‚\›± ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý Ûß ÔÐ å å  ÐÔ4‚Ý ÷ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔWhether€To€Use€The€McDonnell€DouglasÐ Ò Ò ! ÐTripartite€Formula€In€Jury€InstructionsÔ6k ÔÝ‚\› ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý 8­ ÔÐ ¿ ¿ " ÐÔ4‚Ý ÷ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔCausation€And€The€"Same€Decision"Ð ¬¬# ÐAffirmative€DefenseÔ6† ÔÝ‚\›š ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý lÈ ÔÔ4‚Ý žÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔIs€There€An€InternalÐ ™™$ ÐInconsistency€In€The€Price€WaterhouseÏFormulation?Ô6s ÔÝ‚\›‡ ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý µ ÔÐ ss& ÐÔ4‚Ý ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔWhen€Should€The€"Same€Decision"€InstructionÐ ``' ÐBe€Given?Ô6ŠÔÝ‚\›žƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ÌÔÔ4‚Ý ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔShould€The€Court€Instruct€OnÐ MM( ÐPermissible€Inferences?Ô6xÔÝ‚\›ŒƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ºÔÐ ::) ÐÔ4‚Ý ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔShould€The€Court€Give€A€Business€JudgmentÐ ''* ÐInstruction?Ô6{ÔÝ‚\›ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ½ÔÔ4‚Ý ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô5.€ConclusionÔ6hÔÝ‚\›|ƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ªÔÐ(+ ? (ÐÔ% ‡ ÔÔ%†@ԀРÐ1.€ò òINTRODUCTIONó ó€Ð %%, ÐÔÌÌÌÔ[1.1]€ÔÌÌ̘ÔJuries€in€civil€cases€are€charged€with€the€duty€of€determining€whether€a€plaintiff€hasÏproven€all€the€elements€of€his€cause€of€action€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence,€and,€if€so,Ïwhat€the€appropriate€damages€should€be.€The€trial€judge€generally€instructs€the€jury€on€the€lawÏafter€the€closing€arguments€are€given,€and€thus,€has€the€final€word€before€the€jury€begins€itsÏdeliberations.€The€timing€and€function€of€the€jury€instructions,€coupled€with€the€authority€of€theÏjudge,€make€the€instructions€a€crucial€part€of€a€trial.ÌÔÌÌÌÔ[1.2]€ÔÌÌÌÔÔThe€stakes€are€high€in€all€employment€discrimination€cases.€The€simplest€of€cases€requiresÏat€least€thousands€of€dollars€in€pretrial€discovery€and€attorneys€fees.€Each€side€has€chosen€to€riskÏlosing€all€rather€than€accept€the€opposing€side's€settlement€offer.€The€parties€have€strongÏemotions€about€the€merits€of€their€respective€positions.€A€directed€verdict€is€unlikely€because€theÏcase€has€already€survived€summary€judgment€and€therefore€the€judge€has€already€decided€thatÏthere€is€sufficient€evidence€to€raise€a€material€issue€of€fact.€Most€cases€contain€a€claim€forÏdamages€for€emotional€/€psychological€harm€(elements€of€compensatory€damages)€whichÏauthorizes€the€jury€to€award€large€monetary€damages.€Such€damage€awards€are€unlikely€to€beÏreversed€because€of€the€wide€range€of€discretion€accorded€to€the€jury€in€this€area.òòÔ4‚Ý ÔÝ‚\›ÝÔÿÔòòÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô(1)Ô6@ÔÝ‚\›TƒÝÔÿÔóóÝ  ÝÔ7Ý ‚Ôóó€ThisÐ Ã-Ã-; Ðdiscretion€is€reflected€in€the€standard€damage€charge,€which€instructs€the€jury€that€they€mayÏaward€damages€for€any€pain,€suffering€or€mental€anguish€that€Plaintiff€experienced€as€aÏconsequence€of€the€Defendant's€actions.€No€evidence€of€the€monetary€value€of€such€intangibleÏthings€as€pain€and€suffering€has€been,€or€need€be,€introduced€into€evidence.€There€is€no€exactÏstandard€for€fixing€the€compensation€to€be€awarded€for€these€elements€of€damage.€Any€awardÐ d2d2@ Ðyou€make€should€be€fair€in€light€of€the€evidence€presented€at€the€trial.Ì3€Devitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff,€òòFederal€Jury€Practice€and€Instructionsóó,€Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý104.05€(1997€Supp.).€Moreover,€compensatory€damages€for€pain€and€suffering€are€often€higher€than€the€amount€necessary€to€compensate€the€plaintiff€for€lost€wages€or€other€monetary€harm.òòÔ4‚ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô(2)Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€Finally,€an€employer€also€risks€verdicts€for€punitive€damages,€the€amounts€of€which€need€not€be€related€to€the€amount€of€harm€suffered€by€the€plaintiff.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[1.3]€Ô  ÔIt€is€difficult€to€draft€clear€and€accurate€instructions€in€discrimination€cases.€Through€statutory€changes€and€numerous€Supreme€Court€decisions€refining€the€law,€the€area€has€become€exceedingly€(and€unnecessarily)€complex.€Such€issues€as€defining€the€precise€causes€of€action€and€adverse€actions,€whether€and€how€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€òòMcDonnell€Douglas,Ô4‚ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcDonnell€Douglas€Corp.€v.€GreenÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  ÔÔ4‚ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô,Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ô€óó411€U.S.€792,€93€S.€Ct.€1817,€36€L.€Ed.€2d€668€(1973),€tripartite€formula,€whether€to€instruct€on€the€employer's€"same€decision"€affirmative€defense,€what€words€to€use€in€describing€the€necessary€causal€connection€that€plaintiff€must€prove,€whether€to€instruct€on€punitive€damages,€how€to€instruct€on€other€types€of€damages,€whether€to€instruct€on€various€inferences€that€may€be€drawn,€and€whether€to€instruct€on€an€employer's€business€judgment€defense€all€have€been€the€subject€of€debate€and€require€thoughtful€analysis€by€the€attorneys€and€the€judge.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[1.4]€Ô  ÔThe€verdict€form€should€be€given€as€much€attention€as€the€instructions.€Special€verdict€forms€are€often€required€because€of€the€affirmative€defense€authorized€under€the€1991€Civil€Rights€Act€that€limits,€but€does€not€eliminate,€an€employer's€liability.€Where€a€jury€is€instructed€on€the€affirmative€defense,€it€must€specifically€state€whether€a€defendant€has€met€its€burden€of€proof€so€that€the€judge€will€know€what€remedies€are€authorized.€In€addition,€there€are€good€arguments€for€requiring€special€verdicts€on€separate€claims€or€separate€adverse€actions€or€separate€items€of€damages,€e.g.,€back€pay,€compensatory€damages,€or€punitive€damages.€On€the€other€hand,€when€verdict€forms€contain€a€number€of€different€sections€and€instructions,€the€possibility€for€misunderstanding€or€confusion€by€the€jury€is€heightened.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[1.5]€Ô  ÔBecause€so€much€is€at€stake€and€the€issues€are€so€complex,€judges€and€attorneys€must€put€a€great€deal€of€time€and€effort€into€drafting€accurate€and€understandable€jury€instructions€and€verdict€forms.€Attorneys€should€begin€thinking€about€the€jury€instructions€and€verdict€form€from€the€time€they€begin€drafting€their€complaints€and€answers;€and€they€should€continue€thinking€about€jury€instructions€throughout€discovery.€Indeed,€focusing€on€basic€jury€instructions€such€as€the€elements€of€the€cause€of€action€and€the€nature€of€the€adverse€actions€for€which€the€plaintiff€is€seeking€compensation€should€help€guide€the€parties€throughout€every€step€of€the€pretrial€proceedings,€including€discovery,€working€with€expert€witnesses,€and€settlement€conferences.€Considering€at€each€step€what€the€plaintiff€must€prove€to€prevail€not€only€will€help€in€drafting€accurate€instructions,€but€also€will€aid€in€conducting€efficient€and€cost-effective€discovery€and€promoting€fair€settlements.€The€time€spent€in€this€important€part€of€the€trial€should€not€be€a€last€minute€effort€or€an€afterthought.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[1.6]€Ô  ÔIn€the€sections€which€follow,€I€will€discuss€some€of€the€issues€I€have€identified€as€the€more€troubling€in€the€area€of€jury€instructions€in€an€employment€discrimination€case.ÌÔ% ‡ ÔÔ% † ԀР ÐÔ‡Ô2.€Ô†Ôò òPROCEDUREó ó€ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.1]€Ô  ÔBoth€the€Federal€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€and€the€Local€Rules€of€most€District€Courts€have€provisions€relating€to€the€submission€of€proposed€jury€instructions.€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€51€provides:ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.2]€Ô  ÔAt€the€close€of€the€evidence€or€at€such€earlier€time€during€the€trial€as€the€court€reasonably€directs,€any€party€may€file€written€requests€that€the€court€instruct€the€jury€on€the€law€as€set€forth€in€the€requests.€The€court€shall€inform€counsel€of€its€proposed€action€upon€the€requests€prior€to€their€arguments€to€the€jury.€The€court,€at€its€election,€may€instruct€the€jury€before€or€after€argument,€or€both.€No€party€may€assign€as€error€the€giving€or€the€failure€to€give€an€instruction€unless€that€party€objects€thereto€before€the€jury€retires€to€consider€its€verdict,€stating€distinctly€the€matter€objected€to€and€the€grounds€of€the€objection.€Opportunity€shall€be€given€to€make€the€objection€out€of€the€hearing€of€the€jury.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.3]€Ô  ÔGenerally,€I€will€require€proposed€jury€instructions€and€objections€to€proposed€jury€instructions€to€be€submitted€well€in€advance€of€trial.€I€recognize,€however,€that€by€the€time€the€evidence€is€closed,€the€issues€that€are€submitted€to€the€jury€may€differ€from€what€the€parties€originally€anticipated.€Therefore,€it€is€my€practice€to€give€the€parties€an€opportunity€to€revise€or€supplement€their€proposed€instructions€prior€to€the€final€conference€on€the€jury€instructions.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.4]€Ô  ÔThe€Federal€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€give€the€judge€the€option€of€instructing€the€jury€before€or€after€argument€or€both.€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€51.€Although€the€rules€do€not€cover€instructions€before€the€start€of€the€evidence,€most€judges€will€also€give€some€form€of€preliminary€instructions€before€the€attorneys€give€their€opening€statements.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.5]€Ô  ÔChapter€70€of€Devitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff,€òòFederal€Jury€Practice€and€Instructionsóó€(4th€ed.€1987)€contains€suggested€general€pre-trial€instructions€for€civil€cases.€Federal€judges€generally€will€give€this€type€of€instruction,€which€covers€the€nature€of€the€case,€how€the€case€will€proceed,€the€role€of€the€jury,€the€counsel€and€the€court,€and€the€conduct€of€the€jury€during€the€trial.€These€instructions€will€usually€include€a€description€of€the€claims€and€the€defenses€as€in€the€following€excerpt€from€a€preliminary€instruction€in€a€recent€trial€over€which€I€presided:ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.6]€Ô  ÔPlaintiff,€H.€D.,€brings€this€action€against€the€Board€of€Regents€of€the€University€System€of€Georgia€and€against€Dr.€R.€W.€Mr.€D.€was€employed€with€the€Board€of€Regents€as€a€professor€at€Georgia€State€University.€This€is€a€civil€rights€case€in€which€the€plaintiff€alleges€that€the€Board€of€Regents€decided€not€to€renew€his€employment€contract€as€a€full-time€instructor€and€Dr.€W.€decided€not€to€offer€him€part-time€teaching€positions€because€of€his€race,€color,€and€national€origin.€The€plaintiff€is€Iranian€and€has€darker€skin€than€the€average€Caucasian.€The€Board€of€Regents€and€Dr.€W.€dispute€plaintiff's€claims€and€contend€that€his€employment€contract€as€a€full-time€instructor€was€not€renewed€because€he€was€only€hired€to€temporarily€replace€another€employee€who€took€a€year€off,€and€when€that€employee€returned€there€was€no€longer€a€position€for€plaintiff.€They€also€contend€that€Dr.€W.€did€offer€plaintiff€part-time€teaching€positions,€but€he€did€not€accept€them.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.7]€Ô  ÔSupreme€Court€Justice€Sandra€Day€O'Connor€is€a€strong€advocate€for€thorough€preliminary€instructions.€In€an€article€published€in€the€June€1997€edition€of€the€Federal€Lawyer€she€suggested€that€trial€judges€should€thoroughly€charge€jurors€on€the€substantive€law€of€the€case€before€the€evidence€is€presented.€Justice€O'Connor€stated:Ì[J]urors€should€be€given€general€instructions€on€the€applicable€law€before€the€case€begins.€How€are€they€to€make€sense€of€the€evidence€and€the€mass€of€information€the€parties€will€put€before€them,€unless€they€know€in€advance€what€they€are€looking€for?€Jurors€are€not€vessels€in€which€information€can€be€stored,€to€be€retrieved€intact€when€the€jurors€finally€are€told€what€to€do€with€it.€Jurors€are€people,€and€people€organize€information€as€they€receive€it,€according€to€their€existing€frames€of€reference.€Unless€jurors€are€given€proper€frames€of€reference€at€the€beginning€of€a€case,€they€are€likely€either€to€be€overwhelmed€by€a€mass€of€unorganizable€information,€or€to€devise€their€own€frames€of€reference,€which€may€well€be€inconsistent€with€those€that€the€law€requires.Ð  ÐSandra€Day€O'Connor,€òòJuries:€They€May€Be€Broken,€But€We€Can€Fix€Themóó,€44-JUN€Fed.€Law.€20,€*23-24€(1997)€(footnote€omitted).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.8]€Ô  ÔEven€a€non-substantive€preliminary€instruction,€such€as€the€one€quoted€above,€is€not€without€some€risk.€As€stated€before,€claims€may€change€during€the€course€of€the€trial€and€the€final€version€may€differ€somewhat€from€the€description€given€in€the€preliminary€instruction.€To€minimize€the€risk€of€a€misleading€instruction,€I€typically€read€the€preliminary€description€of€the€case€to€counsel€and€the€parties€before€reading€it€to€the€jury€to€ensure€that€it€comports€with€the€lawyers'€understanding€of€the€contentions€in€the€case.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[2.9]€Ô  ÔWhile€all€federal€judges€give€instructions€orally€from€the€bench,€the€judge€must€decide€whether€also€to€give€the€jury€a€written€copy€of€the€instructions.€In€the€previously€mentioned€article,€Justice€O'Connor€makes€a€strong€pitch€for€giving€the€jurors€a€written€copy€of€the€instructions.€She€argues€as€follows:Ì[W]hen€jurors€do€get€their€detailed€instructions€at€the€end€of€the€trial,€we€should€not€simply€assume€that€they€can€remember,€with€perfect€clarity,€what€is€likely€to€be€a€fairly€long€discussion€of€unfamiliar€principles.€Rather,€each€juror€should€be€given€a€written€copy€of€the€instructions€to€use€during€deliberations.€That€way,€jurors€who€learn€better€by€listening€can€rely€on€the€judges€spoken€instructions,€while€those€who€learn€better€by€reading€can€rely€on€their€written€version.Ð  ÐO'Connor,€òòsupraóó€at€24.€While€I€have€not,€in€the€past,€provided€jurors€with€a€written€copy€of€the€instructions,€I€may€consider€giving€written€copies€in€the€future.Ð  ÐÌÔ% ‡ ÔÔ% † ԀР Ð3.€ò òSOURCES€FOR€JURY€INSTRUCTIONSó ó€ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[3.1]€Ô  ÔThere€are€many€excellent€sources€for€jury€instructions€in€employment€discrimination€cases.€For€instance,€the€Eleventh€Circuit€pattern€instructions€are€helpful€for€general€principles€such€as€burdens€of€proof€and€witness€credibility.€They€do€not,€however,€contain€instructions€specifically€tailored€for€Title€VII€employment€discrimination€cases.€The€closest€they€come€is€the€instruction€for€age€discrimination€cases.òòÔ4‚ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô(3)Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€Devitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff€have€added€a€chapter€on€employment€discrimination€cases.òòÔ4‚ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô(4)Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€Their€instructions€incorporate€the€changes€brought€about€by€the€1991€Civil€Rights€Act,€which€significantly€changed€the€law€in€the€area€of€employment€discrimination.€The€Equal€Employment€Opportunity€Commission€(EEOC)€has€also€drafted€model€instructions€for€employment€discrimination€cases.òòÔ4‚ ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô(5)Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€Lawyers€might€also€want€to€consider€òòEmployment€Litigation:€Model€Jury€Instructionsóó,€American€Bar€Association,€Section€Of€Litigation,€1994€which€has€received€favorable€reviews.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[3.2]€Ô  ÔCounsel€may,€of€course,€draw€from€appellate€court€holdings€in€drafting€jury€instructions.€Those€opinions€which€affirm€instructions€given€in€comparable€cases€are€the€most€persuasive.€In€addition,€numerous€CLE€manuals€and€practice€guides€are€published€on€Westlaw€and€Lexis€and€are€often€an€excellent€source€for€sample€instructions.€Finally,€lawyers€might€want€to€consider€reviewing€instructions€from€comparable€cases€before€the€same€or€other€judges€in€the€district.€These€are€available€in€the€transcripts€contained€in€the€court€files€in€the€Clerk's€office.ÌÔ% ‡! ÔÔ% †! ԀР Ð4.€ò òPARTICULAR€ISSUES€IN€TITLE€VII€CASESó ó€Ð  ÐòòNature€Of€The€Claimóó€Ð  ÐÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.1]€Ô  ÔI€am€often€surprised€to€see€the€lack€of€specificity€in€a€Title€VII€complaint.€Sometimes,€I€cannot€tell€from€reading€a€complaint€exactly€what€cause€of€action€a€plaintiff€is€asserting.€For€example,€while€a€complaint€might€clearly€charge€sex€discrimination€in€connection€with€a€particular€adverse€action,€it€might€also€contain€allegations€that€sound€like€retaliation€or€that€hint€at€a€hostile€work€environment;€yet€these€causes€of€action€are€not€set€forth€in€separate€and€distinct€counts€or€paragraphs.€Because€the€elements€of€an€employment€discrimination€claim€vary€depending€on€the€precise€nature€of€the€cause€of€action,€this€lack€of€precision,€if€not€eliminated€before€the€trial,€can€create€difficulties€in€drafting€jury€instructions.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.2]€Ô  ÔSimilarly,€it€is€not€always€clear€to€the€court€what€adverse€actions€the€plaintiff€is€asserting€in€her€cause€of€action.€Often,€there€will€be€a€narrative€recitation€of€all€the€alleged€wrongs€committed€by€the€employer€ranging€from€the€trivial€to€the€serious.€If€the€plaintiff€does€not€specify€which€of€these€wrongs€she€contends€entitle€her€to€compensation,€as€opposed€to€the€ones€which€are€merely€evidence€that€support€her€claims,€the€court€will€not€know€how€to€properly€instruct€the€jury.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.3]€Ô  ÔFor€these€reasons,€I€will€routinely€ask€plaintiff's€counsel€to€state€on€the€record€at€the€pretrial€conference€exactly€what€are€the€claims€and€adverse€actions,€and€then€inquire€as€to€whether€defendant's€counsel€agrees€that€those€are€the€issues€to€be€submitted€to€the€jury.€The€parties€then€must€focus€on€the€specified€claims€and€causes€of€action€in€drafting€their€proposed€jury€instructions€and€verdict€forms.ÌÔ% ‡" ÔÔ% †" ԀР ÐòòWhether€To€Use€The€McDonnell€Douglas€Tripartite€Formula€In€Jury€Instructionsóó€Ð  ÐÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.4]€Ô  ÔThe€tripartite€formula€used€to€resolve€claims€of€circumstantial€individual€disparate€treatment,€first€established€by€the€Supreme€Court€in€òòÔ4‚#ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcDonnell€Douglas€Corp.€v.€Green,€Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó411€U.S.€792,€93€S.€Ct.€1817,€36€L.€Ed.€2d€668€(1973),€is€by€now€very€familiar€to€practitioners€in€the€area€of€employment€discrimination.€Under€this€formula,€the€allocation€of€burdens€and€order€of€presentation€of€proof€are€as€follows:€(1)€plaintiff€has€the€burden€of€proving€a€òòprimaóó€òòfacieóó€case€of€discrimination€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence;€(2)€if€the€plaintiff€proves€the€òòprimaóó€òòfacieóó€case,€the€burden€then€shifts€to€the€defendant€to€articulate€a€legitimate,€non-discriminatory€reason€for€the€action€taken€against€the€employee;€and€(3)€if€the€defendant€carries€this€burden,€plaintiff€must€have€an€opportunity€to€prove€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€that€the€legitimate€reason€offered€by€the€defendant€was€a€pretext€for€discrimination.€òòÔ4‚$ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcDonnell€DouglasÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,€411€U.S.€at€802-04,€93€S.€Ct.€at€1824-25.€A€òòprimaóó€òòfacieóó€case€of€discriminatory€termination€is€generally€made€by€showing€that€the€plaintiff€is€a€member€of€a€protected€class,€was€qualified€for€the€position,€was€terminated,€and€that€others€outside€the€protected€class€who€were€similarly€situated€were€retained.€òòNix€v.€WLCY€Radio€/€Rahall€Communicationsóó,€738€F.2d€1181,€1185€(11th€Cir.€1984).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.5]€Ô  ÔIn€Title€VII€jury€trials,€the€issue€often€arises€as€to€whether€to€instruct€the€jury€along€the€lines€of€this€tripartite€formula.€The€EEOC€model€instructions€include€the€tripartite€formula.€The€Devitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff€pattern€instructions€do€not.€The€Circuit€Courts€of€Appeals€are€split€on€the€question;€and€decisions€within€the€respective€Circuits€often€conflict.òòÔ4‚%ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô(6)Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€I€outline€below€some€of€the€many€good€reasons€not€to€include€the€tripartite€formula€in€the€jury€instructions.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.6]€Ô  ÔFirst,€judges€should€strive€to€use€language€that€jurors€can€understand.€The€phrase€"prima€facie€case,"€the€concept€of€shifting€burdens,€and€the€distinction€between€the€burden€to€"articulate"€and€the€"burden€of€proof"€are€not€easily€understood€by€the€lay€person.€òòSeeóó€òòCabrera€v.€Jakabovitzóó€24€F.3d€372€(2nd€Cir.€1994)€(criticizing€use€of€òòÔ4‚&ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcDonnell€DouglasÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€framework€in€jury€instructions).€Secondly,€once€the€case€is€tried€and€about€to€be€submitted€to€the€jury,€the€òòÔ4‚'ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcDonnell€DouglasÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€formulation€is€no€longer€relevant.€At€that€point,€the€plaintiff€has€made€out€a€prima€facie€case€and€the€defendant€has€articulated€a€legitimate€non-discriminatory€reason€for€its€actions;€if€they€had€not€done€so,€the€case€would€have€been€resolved€by€a€directed€verdict.€Ô4‚(ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔòòTexas€Dept.€Of€Community€Affairs€v.€Burdineóó,Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ô€450€U.S.€248,€255-56,€101€S.€Ct.€1089,€1095,€67€L.€Ed.€2d€207€(1981)€(if€the€employer€meets€its€burden€of€production,€the€presumption€raised€by€the€prima€facie€case€is€rebutted€and€"drops€from€the€case").€Finally,€cases€are€not€presented€to€a€jury€in€the€order€envisioned€by€òòÔ4‚)ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcDonnell€DouglasÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó.€In€reality,€a€plaintiff€does€not€simply€present€a€prima€facie€case€in€his€case€in€chief.€A€plaintiff€anticipates€the€legitimate€nondiscriminatory€reasons€given€by€the€defendant€and€attempts€to€show€that€they€are€not€valid.€Similarly,€a€typical€defendant€does€not€limit€its€proof€at€trial€to€an€"articulation"€of€its€legitimate€nondiscriminatory€reason€for€the€employment€action.€Rather,€it€puts€on€as€much€evidence€as€it€can€muster€to€attempt€to€prove€that€it€had€legitimate€nondiscriminatory€reasons€for€its€actions.€Because€the€òòÔ4‚*ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcDonnell€DouglasÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€formulation€does€not€accurately€reflect€the€conduct€of€a€typical€employment€discrimination€trial,€reciting€the€formula€would€simply€serve€to€confuse€the€jury.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.7]€Ô  ÔWhile€it€might€not€be€error€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€tripartite€formula,€it€is€clear€that€such€an€instruction€is€not€required,€at€least€in€the€Eleventh€Circuit.€In€òòSpanier€v.€Morrison's€Mgmt.€Servs.,€Inc.óó€822€F.2d€975€(11th€Cir.€1987),€an€Eleventh€Circuit€panel€affirmed€a€jury€charge€that€did€not€include€an€instruction€to€analyze€the€evidence€according€to€the€òòÔ4‚+ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcDonnell€DouglasÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€scheme.€The€court€reasoned€that,€"when€the€court€has€allowed€both€parties€to€develop€their€full€proof,€the€analysis€of€the€evidence€should€look€to€whether€plaintiff€has€met€the€ultimate€burden€of€persuading€the€trier€of€fact€that€he€has€been€the€victim€of€intentional€discrimination."€822€F.2d€at€980.ÌÔ% ‡, ÔÔ% †, ԀР ÐòòCausation€And€The€"Same€Decision"€Affirmative€Defenseóó€Ð  ÐÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.8]€Ô  ÔThe€basic€language€of€Title€VII€applicable€in€most€discrimination€cases€is€simple.€Ô4‚-ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔTitle€42,€U.S.C.€Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý2000e-2(a)(1)Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ô€makes€it€an€unlawful€employment€practice€for€an€employer€to€"fail€or€refuse€to€hire€or€to€discharge€any€individual,€or€otherwise€to€discriminate€against€any€individual€with€respect€to€his€compensation,€terms,€conditions,€or€privileges€of€employment,€òòbecause€ofóó€such€individual's€race,€color,€religion,€sex€or€national€origin."€Despite€its€simplicity,€the€Supreme€Court,€in€Ô4‚.ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔòòPrice€Waterhouse€v.€Hopkinsóó,Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ô€490€U.S.€228,€109€S.€Ct.€1775,€104€L.€Ed.€2d€268€(1989)€in€sixty-seven€pages,€and€four€separate€opinions,€only€one€of€which€was€joined€by€four€justices,€struggled€with€the€meaning€of€the€phrase€"because€of"€in€a€sex€discrimination€case.€What€emerged€as€the€holding€(from€reading€Justice€O'Connor's€separate€decision€together€with€the€plurality)€was€that€a€plaintiff€could,€in€cases€involving€direct€evidence€of€discrimination,€shift€the€burden€to€the€employer€by€showing€that€a€prohibited€factor€(in€òòÔ4‚/ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,sex)€motivated€an€employer€in€an€employment€decision€even€if€the€employer€was€also€motivated€by€legitimate€factors.€The€employer€could€then€prevail€by€proving,€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence,€that€the€same€decision€would€have€been€made€based€on€legitimate€non-discriminatory€reasons.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.9]€Ô  ÔCongress€enacted€the€following€two€provisions€of€the€Civil€Rights€Act€of€1991€in€response€to€òòÔ4‚0ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó:€(1)€Title€42,€U.S.C.Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý€2000e-2(m)€provides,€in€relevant€part:ÌAn€unlawful€employment€practice€is€established€when€the€complaining€party€demonstrates€that€race,€color,€religion,€sex€or€national€origin€was€a€motivating€factor€for€any€employment€practice,€even€though€other€factors€also€motivated€the€practice;Ì(2)€Ô4‚1ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔTitle€42,€U.S.C.€Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý2000e-5(g)(2)(B)€Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôprovides,€in€relevant€part:ÌOn€a€claim€in€which€an€individual€proves€a€violation€under€section€2000e-2(m)€of€this€title€and€a€respondent€demonstrates€that€the€respondent€would€have€taken€the€same€action€in€the€absence€of€the€impermissible€motivating€factor,€the€court€-€(I)€may€grant€declaratory€relief€(except€as€provided€in€clause€(ii)),€and€attorney's€fees€and€costs€demonstrated€to€be€directly€attributable€only€to€the€pursuit€of€a€claim€under€20003-2(m)€of€this€title;€and€(ii)€shall€not€award€damages€or€issue€an€order€requiring€any€admission,€reinstatement,€hiring,€promotion€or€payment,€described€in€subparagraph€(A).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.10]€Ô  ÔIn€effect,€Congress€enacted€into€law€the€òòÔ4‚2ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóóplurality's€interpretation€of€Title€VII€that€a€plaintiff€prevails€by€proving€that€the€prohibited€factor€was€a€motivating€factor€even€if€other€factors€also€motivated€the€employer.€However,€Congress€overruled€that€portion€of€òòÔ4‚3ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóóthat€held€that€an€employer€can€escape€all€liability€if€it€proves€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€even€in€the€absence€of€discrimination.€Instead,€the€1991€Act€allows€a€plaintiff€to€obtain€limited€declaratory€relief,€attorneys€fees€and€costs,€even€if€an€employer€succeeds€in€persuading€the€jury€on€its€"same€decision"€affirmative€defense.€In€addition,€the€1991€Act€eliminated€any€distinction€between€"direct€evidence"€and€"circumstantial€evidence"€cases,€a€distinction€created€by€Justice€O'Connor's€concurring€opinion€in€òòÔ4‚4ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.11]€Ô  ÔThe€1991€Act€raises€the€following€two€important€issues€with€respect€to€jury€instructions:€(1)€Can€an€employer€be€motivated€by€a€prohibited€factor€and€at€the€same€time€be€able€to€prove€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€even€if€it€had€not€been€motivated€by€the€prohibited€factor?;€and€(2)€Should€the€instruction€on€shifting€the€burden€to€the€employer€be€given€even€if€the€employer€has€not€pled€an€affirmative€defense€or€even€claimed€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€anyway?€I€will€address€each€of€these€issues€below.ÌÔ% ‡5 ÔÔ% †5 ԀР ÐòòIs€There€An€Internal€Inconsistency€In€The€Price€Waterhouse€Formulation?óó€Ð  ÐÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.12]€Ô  ÔDevitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff€suggest€that€the€jury€be€instructed€as€follows€with€respect€to€the€òòÔ4‚6ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóóformulation€as€codified€in€the€1991€Act:ÌIn€showing€that€plaintiff's€[race]€[color]€[religion]€[sex]€[national€origin]€was€a€motivating€factor,€plaintiff€is€not€required€to€prove€that€[his]€[her]€[race]€[color]€[religion]€[sex]€was€the€sole€motivation€or€even€the€primary€motivation€for€defendant's€decision.€The€plaintiff€need€only€prove€that€[race]€[color]€[religion]€[sex]€[national€origin]€played€a€part€in€the€defendant's€decision€even€though€other€factors€may€also€have€motivated€the€defendant.ÌIf€you€find€from€the€evidence€that€[race]€[color]€[religion]€[sex]€[national€origin]€was,€more€likely€than€not,€a€motivating€factor€in€the€defendant's€employment€decision€.€.€.€you€should€so€indicate€on€the€verdict€form.Ì[Defendant€_______€claims€that€even€if€[race]€[color]€[religion]€[sex]€[national€origin]€were€motivating€factors€in€[his]€[her]€[its]€decision,€the€defendant€would€have€taken€the€same€action€concerning€the€plaintiff€in€the€absence€of€the€unlawful€motive.ÌIf€you€find€that€Defendant€_______€would€have,€more€likely€than€not,€made€the€same€employment€decision€.€.€.€concerning€the€plaintiff€even€if€the€unlawful€motive€was€not€present,€you€should€so€indicate€on€the€verdict€form.]Ð  Ð3€Devitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff,€òòFederal€Jury€Practice€and€Instructionsóó,€Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý104.03€(1997€Supp.).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.13]€Ô  ÔJustice€Kennedy,€in€his€dissenting€opinion€in€òòÔ4‚7ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó(joined€by€Chief€Justice€Rehnquist€and€Justice€Scalia),€raises€the€troubling€possibility€that€there€is€an€internal€inconsistency€in€the€plurality's€proposition€(now€codified€in€the€1991€Act€and€embodied€in€the€above€instruction)€that€an€employer€can€be€motivated€to€act€by€a€prohibited€factor€(let's€say€sex€for€simplicity)€and€still€be€able€to€prove€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€even€if€sex€had€not€been€a€factor.€He€points€to€the€use€of€the€language€"because€of"€in€Title€VII€and€notes:€"By€any€normal€understanding,€the€phrase€"because€of"€conveys€the€idea€that€the€motive€in€question€made€a€difference€to€the€outcome.€We€use€the€words€this€way€in€everyday€speech."€òòÔ4‚8ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,€490€U.S.€at€281,€109€S.€Ct.€at€1807.€He€explains€that€"because€of"€means€that€the€event€would€not€have€occurred€but€for€the€prohibited€factor.€Justice€Kennedy€continues:ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.14]€Ô  ÔThe€most€confusing€aspect€of€the€plurality's€analysis€of€causation€and€liability€is€its€internal€inconsistency.€The€plurality€begins€by€saying:€"When€...€an€employer€considers€both€gender€and€legitimate€factors€at€the€time€of€making€a€decision,€that€decision€was€'because€of'€sex€and€the€other,€legitimate€considerations--even€if€we€may€say€later,€in€the€context€of€litigation,€that€the€decision€would€have€been€the€same€if€gender€had€not€been€taken€into€account."€.€.€.€Yet€it€goes€on€to€state€that€"an€employer€shall€not€be€liable€if€it€can€prove€that,€even€if€it€had€not€taken€gender€into€account,€it€would€have€come€to€the€same€decision."€.€.€.€Given€the€language€of€the€statute,€these€statements€cannot€both€be€true."Ð  Ð490€U.S.€at€285,€109€S.€Ct.€at€1809€(internal€citations€omitted).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.15]€Ô  ÔUsing€Justice€Kennedy's€reasoning,€if,€in€a€sex€discrimination€case,€"motivating€factor"€means€that€the€plaintiff's€sex€òòplayed€a€partóó€in€the€employer's€decision,€then€doesn't€it€mean€that€the€fact€that€she€was€female€made€a€difference€in€the€outcome?€If€so,€how€can€it€also€be€true€that€the€same€decision€would€have€been€made€even€if€plaintiff€had€been€male?€The€only€way€I€can€reconcile€the€two€propositions€is€by€assuming€that€the€employer's€determination€that€the€plaintiff€would€have€been€terminated€anyway€is€based€on€an€after-the-fact€analysis€similar€to€the€one€an€employer€must€conduct€if€it€wishes€to€rely€on€after-acquired€evidence€of€misconduct€to€prove€that€an€employee€is€not€entitled€to€certain€types€of€damages.€òòSeeóó€òòÔ4‚9ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMcKennon€v.€Nashville€Banner€Publishing€Co.Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó€513€U.S.€352,€115€S.€CT.€879,€130€L.€Ed.€2d€852€(1995)€(holding€that€when€an€employer€acquires€evidence€of€an€employee's€misconduct€after€an€employee€has€been€terminated€and€it€proves€that€it€would€have€terminated€the€employee€for€that€misconduct,€the€employer€may€not€be€found€liable€for€back€pay€from€the€date€the€new€information€was€discovered).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.16]€Ô  ÔThe€inconsistency€was€noted€in€a€dissenting€opinion€in€the€Seventh€Circuit€by€a€judge€who€objected€to€the€phrase€"determining€factor":ÌThus,€if€a€jury€accepts€the€plaintiff's€contention€that€age€was€a€"determining€factor"€in€his€discharge,€it€has€necessarily€rejected€the€employer's€contention€that€it€would€have€terminated€the€plaintiff€regardless€of€his€age;€both€cannot€simultaneously€be€true.Ð  ÐòòÔ4‚:ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔMayall€v.€Peabody€Coal€Co.Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,€7€F.3d€570,€575€(7th€Cir.€1993)€(Rovner,€dissenting).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.17]€Ô  ÔThe€inconsistency€was€also€noted€in€an€article€by€Rutgers€Law€School€Professor€Alfred€W.€Blumrosen.€Referring€to€òòÔ4‚;ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,€he€stated:ÌSix€Justices€decided€that€an€employer€may€'prove'€a€matter€that€was€inconsistent€with€the€facts€found€in€the€same€case.€An€employer€who€included€discriminatory€considerations€in€a€personnel€decision€could€nevertheless€prevail€if€it€'proved'€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€without€a€discriminatory€intent.€It€is€impossible,€however,€to€prove€a€matter€that€is€inconsistent€with€facts€judicially€established€in€the€same€case.ÌAlfred€W.€Blumrosen,€òòSociety€In€Transition€II:€Price€Waterhouse€And€The€Individual€Employment€Discrimination€Caseóó,€42€Rutgers€L.€Rev.€1023,€1044€(1990)(footnote€omitted).€Professor€Blumrosen€reconciled€this€inconsistency€by€assuming€that€the€Justices€did€not€really€mean€"prove"€in€its€common€meaning,€i.e.€"the€establishment€of€past€events€by€testimony€or€other€evidence."€òòId.óó€Rather,€he€suggests€that€the€most€probable€interpretation€of€the€wording€is€that€the€employer€may€prevail€if€the€factfinder€finds€that€the€employer€would€have€been€justified€in€taking€the€action€in€the€absence€of€a€discriminatory€motive.€òòId.óó€He€goes€on€to€conclude€that€the€òòÔ4‚<ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€Waterhouse€Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóóaffirmative€defense€would€make€it€difficult,€if€not€impossible,€for€a€plaintiff€to€prevail.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.18]€Ô  ÔEven€assuming€that€a€jury€could€logically€find€that€an€employer€who€was€motivated€to€act€by€the€plaintiff's€sex€would€have€made€the€"same€decision"€if€the€plaintiff€had€been€the€opposite€sex,€it€seems€highly€unlikely€that€they€would€do€so.€As€one€commentator€has€stated€with€respect€to€"direct€evidence"€cases:ÌIf€the€jury€chooses€to€believe€the€plaintiff's€"direct€evidence"€against€the€defendant's€denials,€the€chances€are€extremely€remote€that€the€defendant's€"same€decision"€evidence€will€be€believed.€If€the€defendant€has€lost€the€initial€battle€on€direct€evidence,€where€the€burden€of€proof€is€not€yet€imposed€on€him,€how€can€it€hope€to€prevail€on€the€'same€decision'€issue,€when€it€does€carry€the€burden?"ÌStephen€W.€Smith,€òòTitle€VII's€National€Anthem:€Is€There€a€Prima€Facie€case€for€the€Prima€Facie€Case€?óó,€Vol.€12,€No.€3€The€Labor€Lawyer,€ABA€Section€of€Labor€and€Employment€Law,€p.€389€(Winter/Spring€1997).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.19]€Ô  ÔThe€same€reasoning€applies€to€circumstantial€cases.€Asked€another€way,€if€a€plaintiff,€who€has€the€burden€of€proof,€convinces€a€jury€that€the€employer€was€motivated€to€fire€her€because€of€her€sex,€is€the€defendant€likely€to€be€able€to€convince€the€jury,€when€it€has€the€burden€of€proof,€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€if€the€plaintiff€had€been€male?ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.20]€Ô  ÔIn€spite€of€the€logic€of€Justice€Kennedy's€argument,€the€confusing€nature€of€the€instruction,€and€the€unlikelihood€of€a€defendant€being€able€to€prevail€on€this€defense,€the€law€of€the€land€now€is€that€in€the€appropriate€case,€the€court€must€give€the€"same€decision"€instruction.€The€question€then€becomes:€what€is€the€appropriate€case?Ð  ÐÔ% ‡= ÔÔ% †= ԀР ÐòòWhen€Should€The€"Same€Decision"€Instruction€Be€Given?óó€Ð  ÐÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.21]€Ô  ÔIn€the€typical€employment€discrimination€case,€the€employer€understandably€does€not€claim€that€even€if€a€prohibited€factor€was€a€motivating€factor€in€its€decision,€it€would€have€taken€the€same€action€in€the€absence€of€the€unlawful€motive.€Such€a€statement€may€send€the€message€to€the€jury€that€the€employer€may€have€discriminated.€The€employer€usually€takes€the€position€that€it€had€legitimate€reasons€for€its€actions€and€did€not€discriminate.€In€the€typical€case,€the€evidence€might€support€a€finding€that€both€legitimate€and€illegitimate€factors€motivated€the€employer.€The€dilemma€for€the€court€is€then€whether€to€give€the€"same€decision"€instruction€in€the€absence€of€an€express€claim€that€the€employer€would€have€made€the€same€decision€in€the€absence€of€the€illegal€motivation.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.22]€Ô  ÔOften,€neither€party€will€request€the€"same€decision"€instruction.€The€defendant€may€not€want€it€because€it€shifts€the€burden€of€proof€to€the€defendant€and€it€may€be€confusing.€The€defendant€may€prefer€to€rely€on€the€position€that€the€plaintiff€has€not€proven€that€discrimination€was€a€motivating€factor€rather€than€add€an€affirmative€defense€of€what€the€employer€would€have€done€in€the€absence€of€discrimination.€A€plaintiff,€however,€sometimes€wants€to€impose€the€burden€of€proof€on€the€defendant€and€therefore€requests€that€the€instruction€be€given€over€the€defendant's€objection.€òòSeeóó€òòÔ4‚>ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔFields€v.€New€York€State€Office€of€Mental€Retardation€and€Developmental€DisabilitiesÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,€115€F.3d€116,€121-122€(2nd€Cir.€1997)€(discussing€cases€in€Second€Circuit€where€affirmative€defense€instruction€was€given€when€requested€by€only€the€plaintiff).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.23]€Ô  ÔThe€plurality€in€òòÔ4‚?ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔPrice€WaterhouseÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóósaid€that€the€employer's€burden€to€show€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€anyway€is€"most€appropriately€deemed€an€affirmative€defense".€490€U.S.€at€246,€109€S.€Ct.€at€1788.€If€the€trial€court€treats€the€employer's€burden€as€an€affirmative€defense,€the€decision€of€what€to€do€when€the€employer€doesn't€want€the€instruction€is€easy:€the€instruction€is€not€given€because€affirmative€defenses€must€be€asserted€by€a€defendant.€I€am€aware€of€no€other€area€of€law€where€an€affirmative€defense€may€be€imposed€on€an€unwilling€defendant.€Of€course,€if€a€defendant€pleads€the€"same€decision"€affirmative€defense€and€presents€evidence€and€argument€on€it,€the€decision€is€also€easy:€in€that€case€the€instruction€will€be€given.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.24]€Ô  ÔThe€difficulty€arises€when€the€defendant€requests€the€instruction,€yet€has€not€pled€an€affirmative€defense,€presented€evidence€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€anyway,€or€even€argued€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€in€the€absence€of€discrimination.€The€defendant€has€simply€defended€on€the€basis€that€it€had€legitimate€non-discriminatory€reasons€for€its€actions€and€did€not€discriminate.€If€"deeming"€something€as€an€affirmative€defense€means€treating€it€just€as€any€other€affirmative€defense,€then€a€strong€argument€can€be€made€that€if€an€employer€does€not€assert€that€it€would€have€made€the€same€decision€in€the€absence€of€its€discrimination€as€an€affirmative€defense€in€its€answer,€then€it€is€waived.€The€general€rule€on€affirmative€defenses€is€that€"[a]n€affirmative€defense€not€pleaded€in€the€defendant's€answer€is€waived."€òòTroxler€v.€Owens-Illinois,€Inc.óó,€717€F.2d€530,€532€(11th€Cir.€1983)€(citing€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€8(c),€which€requires€a€defendant€to€set€forth€affirmatively€in€its€answer€any€matter€constituting€an€affirmative€defense).€The€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€purpose€of€Rule€8(c)€is€to€give€the€opposing€party€notice€of€the€affirmative€defense€and€a€chance€to€rebut€it.€òòÔ4‚@ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔBlonder-Tongue€Labs.,€Inc.€v.€Univ.€of€Illinois€Found.Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,€402€U.S.€313,€350,€91€S.€Ct.€1434,€1453,€28€L.€Ed.€2d€788€(1971).€The€Eleventh€Circuit€has€found€one€type€of€affirmative€defense€to€alleged€employment€discrimination€to€have€been€waived€when€not€expressly€pleaded€and€included€in€the€pretrial€order.€òòGrant€v.€Preferred€Research,€Inc.óó,€885€F.2d€795€(11th€Cir.€1989)€(holding€defendant€waived€the€bona€fide€seniority€system€affirmative€defense€to€Title€VII€by€failing€to€assert€it€until€three€days€prior€to€trial).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.25]€Ô  ÔMoreover,€it€may€not€be€sufficient€just€to€assert€the€affirmative€defense.€The€general€rule€is€that,€"Where€a€party€presents€no€evidence€to€support€a€particular€theory€of€his€case,€he€has€no€right€to€a€jury€instruction€on€that€point."€òòPierce€v.€F.R.€Tripler€&€Co.óó,€955€F.2d€820,€826€(2d€Cir.€1992).€Why€should€the€rule€be€any€different€on€this€issue?€It€may€be€confusing€to€a€jury€to€be€instructed€on€a€claim€that€an€employer€has€never€made.€These€issues€are€yet€to€be€resolved.ÌÔ% ‡A ÔÔ% †A ԀР ÐòòShould€The€Court€Instruct€On€Permissible€Inferences?óó€Ð  ÐÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.26]€Ô  ÔA€circumstantial€case€by€definition€requires€the€jury€to€draw€inferences.€The€most€often€discussed€inference€in€employment€discrimination€cases€is€the€inference€that€a€jury€may€draw€if€it€disbelieves€the€employer's€proffered€reason.€In€òòÔ4‚BÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔSt€Mary's€Honor€Center€v.€HicksÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,€509€U.S.€502,€113€S.€Ct.€2742,€125€L.€Ed.€2d€407€(1993),€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€a€jury€may,€but€is€not€required€to,€infer€that€an€employer€unlawfully€discriminated€if€it€disbelieves€the€employer's€stated€reason€for€taking€an€adverse€action€against€an€employee.€509€U.S.€at€511,€113€S.€Ct.€at€2749.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.27]€Ô  ÔThe€question€often€arises€as€to€whether€the€court€should€instruct€the€jury€that€it€is€permitted€to€draw€this€inference.€Generally,€the€trial€court€does€not€instruct€the€jury€on€permissible€inferences€because€there€are€any€number€of€inferences€that€can€be€argued€in€a€particular€case.€For€example,€a€plaintiff€may€argue€that€an€inference€of€discrimination€may€be€drawn€from€stray€remarks€in€the€work€place,€disparate€treatment€of€other€employees,€or€statistics€on€the€composition€of€the€workforce.€A€defendant€may€argue€that€an€inference€of€no€discrimination€should€be€drawn€from€the€fact€that€the€decisionmaker€is€the€same€race€or€sex€as€the€plaintiff,€or€that€the€decisionmaker€had€been€the€one€who€hired€the€plaintiff€shortly€before€the€adverse€action€was€taken.€Singling€out€a€particular€inference€for€instruction€by€the€judge€may€give€it€undue€emphasis.€Also,€it€is€likely€that€a€jury€will€understand,€without€being€told€by€the€judge,€that€if€an€employer€is€lying€about€its€real€reason€for€its€employment€actions,€it€may€be€trying€to€cover€up€an€unlawful€reason,€and€that€unlawful€reason€may€be€the€discriminatory€reason€asserted€by€the€plaintiff.€A€judge€need€not€instruct€a€jury€on€something€that€jurors€can€glean€from€everyday€experience€and€that€is€likely€to€be€argued€by€the€lawyers.€òòSeeóó€òòGehring€v.€Case€Corpóó.,€43€F.3d€340,€343€(7th€Cir.€1994)(noting€that€a€district€court€"need€not€deliver€instructions€describing€all€valid€legal€principles.€Especially€not€when€the€principle€in€question€describes€a€permissible,€but€not€an€obligatory€inference.€Many€an€inference€is€possible.€Rather€than€describing€each,€the€judge€may€and€usually€should€leave€the€subject€to€the€argument€of€counsel");€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Grebeldinger,€òòsupraóó€at€413.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.28]€Ô  ÔFinally,€the€pattern€instructions€on€employment€discrimination€in€Devitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff€do€not€include€instructions€on€permissible€inferences.€Despite€these€arguments€for€not€giving€an€instruction€on€this€inference,€an€inference€instruction€might€be€given€to€balance€a€business€judgment€instruction,€as€discussed€below.Ð  ÐÔ% ‡C ÔÔ% †C ԀР ÐòòShould€The€Court€Give€A€Business€Judgment€Instruction?óó€Ð  ÐÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.29]€Ô  ÔUsually€a€defendant€will€request€an€instruction€that€informs€the€jury€that€it€cannot€be€found€liable€for€exercising€its€business€judgment,€even€if€the€jury€disagrees€with€the€manner€in€which€it€did€so,€as€long€as€its€reasons€were€not€discriminatory.€This€idea€is€expressed€in€the€oft-quoted€paragraph€from€òòNix€v.€WLCY€Radio/Rahall€Communicationsóó,€738€F.2d€1181,€1187€(11th€Cir.€1984)€(an€"employer€may€fire€an€employee€for€a€good€reason,€a€bad€reason,€a€reason€based€on€erroneous€facts,€or€for€no€reason€at€all,€as€long€as€its€action€is€not€for€a€discriminatory€reason").€At€least€one€Circuit€Court€has€found€that€it€is€error€not€to€give€some€type€of€business€judgment€instruction.€òòSeeóó€òòÔ4‚DÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  ÔStemmons€v.€Missouri€Dept.€of€CorrectionsÔ6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ôóó,€82€F.3d€817,€819€(8th€Cir.€1996).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.30]€Ô  ÔDevitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff's€pattern€instruction€for€Age€Discrimination€cases€contains€the€following€language:ÌYou€should€not€find€that€the€decision€is€unlawful€just€because€you€may€disagree€with€the€defendant's€stated€reasons€or€because€you€believe€the€decision€was€harsh€or€unreasonable,€as€long€as€the€defendant€would€have€reached€the€same€decision€regardless€of€the€plaintiff's€age.Ì3€Devitt,€Blackmar€and€Wolff,€òòFederal€Jury€Practice€and€Instructionsóó,€Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý€106.03€(1997€Supp.).ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.31]€Ô  ÔThe€court€will€often€allow€evidence€to€be€admitted€that€tends€to€show€that€the€employer's€action€was€unreasonable€or€unjustified.€This€evidence€comes€in€because€it€may€support€an€inference€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff€that€the€employer's€stated€reason€for€its€action€was€not€its€true€reason.€However,€once€this€evidence€comes€in,€there€is€a€risk€that€a€jury€may€misunderstand€its€purpose€and€believe€that€it€may€base€its€verdict€on€what€it€believes€to€be€improper€or€unreasonable,€but€not€necessarily€discriminatory,€actions€on€the€part€of€the€employer.€It€may€not€be€obvious€to€a€jury€that€the€employer€may€not€be€found€liable€just€for€unreasonable€or€unjustified€actions.€For€this€reason,€I€may€be€favorably€disposed€to€giving€a€business€judgment€instruction.€I€have€given€instructions€as€follows:ÌFederal€laws€that€prohibit€discrimination€in€employment€do€not€take€away€an€employer's€right€to€take€action€against€its€employees.€Rather,€these€laws€address,€in€this€case,€discrimination€because€of€an€employee's€race.€The€laws€against€race€discrimination€are€not€a€shield€against€harsh€treatment€in€the€work€place.€Nor€do€these€anti-discrimination€laws€require€the€employer€to€have€good€cause€for€its€decisions.€An€employer€may€take€actions€against€an€employee€for€a€good€reason,€a€bad€reason,€a€reason€based€on€erroneous€facts,€or€for€no€reason€at€all€as€long€as€its€decision€is€not€based€on€a€discriminatory€reason€--€that€is,€as€long€as€it€is€not€because€of€the€employee's€race.€Even€if€the€employer's€judgment€or€course€of€action€seems€poor€or€erroneous€to€outsiders,€the€proper€question€in€this€case€is€simply€whether€the€given€reasons€for€the€employer's€decision€were€a€pretext€for€race€discrimination€against€Plaintiff.ÌÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[4.32]€Ô  ÔAt€the€same€time,€I€would€consider€balancing€such€an€instruction€with€an€instruction€explaining€the€permissible€inference€that€may€be€drawn€if€a€jury€disbelieves€an€employer's€proffered€legitimate€reason€for€its€actions.ÌÔ% ‡E ÔÔ% †E ԀР Ð5.€ConclusionÐ  ÐÔ ÌÌÌ Ô[5.1]€Ô  ÔJury€instructions€in€employment€discrimination€cases€are€important€and€should€be€given€careful€thought€from€the€earliest€stages€of€case€preparation.€The€parties€must€be€thoroughly€familiar€with€the€applicable€procedural€rules,€the€contentions€in€their€case,€and€the€case€and€statutory€law€relevant€to€those€contentions.€Counsel€and€the€trial€judge€should€have€as€their€ultimate€goal€instructions€that€accurately€describe€the€parties'€contentions€and€the€legal€principles€to€be€applied,€and€that€are€easily€understood€by€lay€persons.€Achieving€this€goal€requires€careful€consideration€by€counsel€and€the€trial€judge€of€many€issues,€many€of€which€have€not€yet€been€fully€resolved€by€the€higher€courts.Ð  Ðß8€F) °°xdt8ßÐ  ÐòòArticlesóó€ÌAlfred€W.€Blumrosen,€òòSociety€In€Transition€II:€Price€Waterhouse€And€The€Individual€Employment€Discrimination€Caseóó,€42€Rutgers€L.€Rev.€1023€(1990).ÌSusan€K.€Grebeldinger,€òòInstructing€The€Jury€In€A€Case€Of€Circumstantial€Individual€Disparate€Treatment:€Thoroughness€Or€Simplicity?óó,€Vol.€12,€No.€3€The€Labor€Lawyer,€ABA€Section€of€Labor€and€Employment€Law,€p.€399€(Winter/Spring€1997).ÌSandra€Day€O'Connor,€òòJuries:€They€May€Be€Broken,€But€We€Can€Fix€Themóó,€44-JUN€Fed.€Law.€20€(1997).ÌStephen€W.€Smith,€òòTitle€VII's€National€Anthem:€Is€There€a€Prima€Facie€case€for€the€Prima€Facie€Case€?óó,€Vol.€12,€No.€3€The€Labor€Lawyer,€ABA€Section€of€Labor€and€Employment€Law,€p.€371€(Winter/Spring€1997).Ð  Ðß8€F) °°xdt8ßÐ  ÐÔ% ‡G ÔÔ% †G ԀР Ð1.€The€Civil€Rights€Act€of€1991€establishes€the€following€caps€for€compensatory€and€punitive€damages€combined:€(a)€$50,000€for€an€employer€with€15€to€100€employees;€(b)€$100,000€for€an€employer€with€101€to€200€employees;€(c)€$200,000€for€an€employer€with€201€to€500€employees€and€(d)€$300,000€for€an€employer€with€more€than€500€employees.€A€separate€cap€applies€for€each€distinct€claim€and€the€caps€do€not€cover€back€pay€and€prejudgment€interest.€42€U.S.C.€Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý1981a(b)(3).€The€court€does€not€instruct€the€jury€on€the€caps€but€must€reduce€any€verdict€that€exceeds€them.€Ô4‚HÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ5  Ô42€U.S.C.€Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý1981a(c)(2).Ô6  ÔÝ‚ÝÝ  ÝÔ7  Ô€ÌÔ% ‡I ÔÔ% †I ԀР Ð2.€The€Eleventh€Circuit€pattern€jury€instructions€provide,€in€relevant€part,€"compensatory€damages€are€not€restricted€to€actual€loss€of€time€or€money;€they€cover€both€the€mental€and€physical€aspects€of€the€injury€--€tangible€and€intangible.€They€are€an€attempt€to€restore€the€Plaintiff,€that€is,€to€make€him€whole€or€as€he€was€immediately€prior€to€his€injuries."€Pattern€jury€Instructions€(Civil€Cases),€U.S.€Eleventh€Circuit€District€Judges€Association,€Damages€Instruction€No.€1.3€and€1.4€(1990).ÌÔ% ‡J ÔÔ% †J ԀР Ð3.€òòSeeóó€Pattern€Jury€Instructions€(Civil€Cases),€U.S.€Eleventh€Circuit€District€Judges€Association,€Federal€Claim€Instruction€7.1€(1990).ÌÔ% ‡K ÔÔ% †K ԀР Ð4.€òòSeeóó€Devitt,€Blackmar€&€Wolff,€3€òòFederal€Jury€Practice€and€Instructionsóó,€Ý‚MÝÝ  ݧÝ‚MÝÝ  Ý104.01€òòetóó€òòseq.óó€(1997€Suppl.).ÌÔ% ‡L ÔÔ% †L ԀР Ð5.€òòSeeóó€òòEEOC€General€Counsel's€Memorandum€on€Supreme€Court's€òòHicksóó€Decisionóó,€Fair€Empl.€Prac.€Manual€(BNA)€405:7151,€7156-58€(March€1994).ÌÔ% ‡M ÔÔ% †M ԀР Ð6.€òòSeeóó€Susan€K.€Grebeldinger,€òòInstructing€The€Jury€In€A€Case€Of€Circumstantial€Individual€Disparate€Treatment:€Thoroughness€Or€Simplicity?óó,€Vol.€12,€No.€3€The€Labor€Lawyer,€ABA€Section€of€Labor€and€Employment€Law,€p.€399€(Winter/Spring€1997)€(collecting€cases).